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PETITIONERS' FAULT IN MATRIMONIAL
ACTIONS
Gerald Malkant
Family law is today burdened with a number of monumental
problems, evidenced by widespread debate on such matters as family
court structure, migratory troubles, and adoption graymarkets.1 These
socio-legal foci have elicited imaginative stands from all legal ranks,
with a consequent renaissance throughout the field of domestic relations.
Judicial probing is beginning to reach far, touching long-neglected,
important areas. One such zone is the unclean hands doctrine, often
utilized by courts to deny relief to faulty petitioners in matrimonial
actions.
Parties requesting relief in matrimonial litigation frequently have
themselves acted indecorously either before or during the action. The
petitioners' fault may involve perjury in the action, fraud perpetrated
upon another court in a different suit, defiance of the positive law or
of some societal injunction, or improper treatment of the defendant.
When a petitioner is thus chargeable with bad conduct, a question
arises as to whether a positive judgment is thereby barred. Many
petitioners, soiled but otherwise worthy, have been denied relief, even
though relief was designed for the welfare of society. Although
rejection of a matrimonial petition for unclean hands is a firm Ameri-
can doctrine, the actual imposition of a bar depends somewhat upon
jurisdiction and circumstance.
Although unclean hands as a bar in matrimonial actions cuts
through annulment, divorce, support, and property rights, a consider-
able portion of today's clean hands law is antique and probably was
without justification from the outset. In the past, techniques have
been lacking to discover and adequately treat policy considerations
present in petitioners' fault cases, giving rise to conceptual judgments,
insufficiently consequence-oriented.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. LL.B.,
1954, Harvard University.
1. See DzspmaT, CHILDRnN op DIVORCz (1953); GL.LHoRsN, CHILDREN AND FAM-
ILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY (1954); Bradway, Divorce Litigation and
the Welfare of the Family, 9 VAND. L. Rzv. 665 (1956) ; Rheinstein, The Law of Di-
vorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. Rpv. 633 (1956).
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At present, however, an increasing judicial awareness of the
wider significances of family law decisions is beginning to remake
clean hands thinking. There has appeared a modern direction which
takes a highly satisfactory tack, but which may out-rival the old law
in vexatiousness of application.
VoID MARRIAGES
American courts differ as to whether they will grant an annulment
to a person with soiled hands who has entered into a void marriage.'
Many cases 8 declare the clean hands doctrine inapplicable on grounds
of the public's interest in a status determination. Others ' steadfastly
apply the doctrine to deny relief in these circumstances.
Denial-of-annulment cases appear in New Jersey, for example,'
which was sealed in its present clean hands position by Tyll v. Keller.6
In that case the husband asked for an annulment on the ground that
the wife had a prior subsisting marriage. The court denied an annul-
ment, stating that plaintiff was entitled to a decree only if he proved
unawareness, at the time of marriage, of the fact that defendant then
had a living husband. Plaintiff failed to sustain this burden of proof.
The theme of Tyll was carried forward by Ancrum v. Ancrum,7
where husband-petitioner discovered the prior living husband two
years after marriage. A brief separation followed; the parties then
2. For a working definition of the distinction between void and voidable marriages,
see Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 766, 14 N.W2d 613, 615 (1944) : ". . . a
marriage is termed void when it is not valid for any legal purpose. It is void ab initio
by statute and its invalidity may be maintained in any proceeding in any court between
any proper parties, whether in the lifetime or after the death of the supposed husband
and wife, and whether the question arises directly by petition for an annulment or
collaterally in other proceedings. On the other hand, a marriage is voidable when it has
legal imperfections in its constitution which can be inquired into only during the lives
of both of the parties in a proceeding by annulment to obtain a judgment of a com-
petent court declaring its invalidity. Otherwise a voidable marriage is legally valid for
all civil purposes until its nullity is so pronounced."
If a marriage is void, it is ordinarily not necessary to obtain a court decree to
make it void, even where a statutory annulment proceeding is provided. The purpose of
such statutes is to protect the welfare of society by an orderly determination of status,
to aid the tranquility of the parties, and to afford an opportunity to have proof of in-
validity presented in the form of a judicial record at a time when evidence may be ob-
tainable and the parties are living. See Gearllach v. Odom, 200 Ga. 350, 37 S.E2d 184
(1946) ; Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 63 A2d 743 (1949).
3. See Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 145, 16 So. 2d 401 (1944) ; Sullivan v. Sulli-
van, 219 Cal. 734, 28 P2d 914 (1934) ; Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N.E.2d
645 (1937).
4. See Tyll v. Keller, 94 N.J. Eq. 426, 120 Atl. 6 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923) ; Lodati
v. Lodati, 268 App. Div. 1003, 52 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1944); see also Otte v.
Pierce, 118 Colo. 123, 194 P.2d 331 (1948).
5. For the New Jersey background, see Rooney v. Rooney, 54 N.J. Eq. 231, 34
Atl. 682 (Ch. 1896); Freda v. Bergman, 77 N.J. Eq. 46, 76 Atl. 460 (Ch. 1910); Davis
v. Green, 91 N.J. Eq. 17, 108 Atl. 772 (Ch. 1919).
6. 94 N.. Eq. 426, 120 Atl. 6 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923).
7. 9 N.J. Misc. 795, 156 Atl. 22 (Ch. 1931).
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resumed marital cohabitation, living together off and on for three
more years. Annulment was denied. The court said it was un-
conscionable and criminal for the husband to continue to cohabit with
knowledge of the prior marriage, and then at a later day repudiate the
relation and bring suit for annulment. "His misconduct was such as
appears to me as worthy of condemnation, and I am constrained to
deny him the relief prayed for." 8 In this manner, the judicial duty
of decision is discharged by Arthurian romance.'
Of the cases granting annulment, Johnson v. Johnson " is typical.
There, a husband filed a bill seeking annulment, asserting he had a
living wife at the time of the marriage. A demurrer to the bill was
overruled. Noting that the marriage was void, the court said that
"in such cases, the interests of society intervene, and the state is re-
garded as a third party," " and therefore clean hands would not be
applied. Unfortunately, the court left unexplained the interests which
society holds, illustrative of the usual 1 and lamentable inadequacy of
policy analyses in petitioners' fault cases.
Similar reasoning was advanced in an Illinois annulment pro-
ceeding, Jardine v. Jardine,'3 where the petitioner had participated in
a previous fraudulently obtained Nevada divorce secured by the
defendant. As the Jardine fact pattern is a highly important one,
some of the principal variations should be described.
If the foreign divorce decree is held entitled to full faith and
credit, it dissolves the first marriage, and a subsequent marriage will
not be void. In a proceeding brought to annul the second marriage,
no problem concerning the petitioners' fault bar can arise since that
marriage is valid, and relief through an annulment decree can never be
granted. If, however, the prayer is for a declaratory judgment to
8. Id. at 798, 156 Atl. at 23.
9. See also White v. Kessler, 101 N.J. Eq. 369, 139 Atl. 241 (Ch. 1927). Pending
determination of a divorce suit against her first husband, defendant married White.
Thereafter, she and White cohabited and continued to do so until after the divorce be-
came final. White knew about the divorce action, but claimed he erroneously believed
no prior marriage existed in law since it was not consummated by sexual intercourse.
The court said he was presumed to know the law, and so he had knowledge of the prior
subsisting marriage. Held, no annulment, on the authority of Tyll v. Keller.
10. 245 Ala. 145, 16 So. 2d 401 (1944).
11. Id. at 148, 16 So. 2d at 404.
12. See Anderson v. Anderson, 7 Cal.2d 265, 60 P.2d 290 (1936) ; Sullivan v. Sulli-
van, 219 Cal. 734, 28 P.2d 914 (1934).
13. 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937). At the time of the marriage, the hus-
band was already married since his Nevada divorce decree was void for want of juris-
diction, there having been fraud in establishing the Nevada domicile. The wife, who was
the instant plaintiff, participated in the Nevada imposition, thus soiling her hands. An
annulment was granted on the theory that the best interests of society were served by a
legal determination of the parties' status. See also Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A.2d
593 (1950).
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determine marital status, petitioners' fault is in issue since the desired
relief, a declaration, can be withheld for unclean hands. 4 Where
decrees are not entitled to full faith and credit, 5 annulments of sub-
sequent marriages are possible, and questions of barring relief for
petitioners' fault may be presented.
In the cases thus far discussed, the court's failure to declare a
nullity does not establish legality, although many decisions which
refuse to grant an annulment decree actually establish, to an extent,
the invalidity of the void marriage. Thus, in Lodati v. Lodati,0 an
annulment was denied to petitioner-husband on the ground that he
knew the woman was not free to marry him. This finding of inability
to marry, necessarily making the marriage void, would seem to be
res judicata in a subsequent litigation between the parties or their
privies. Nevertheless, the desired finality has not been achieved, for
another suit could easily involve a stranger, such as a federal tax
collector or a new mate, making relitigable the issue of marriage
validity. Therefore, if a nullity decree is refused the parties may
choose not to marry again for fear of future legal difficulties.
If, at a much later date, rights under a void marriage become in
dispute, it may be necessary to show facts establishing invalidity
which can no longer be proved. For example, fraud perpetrated upon
a court in obtaining a divorce may result in an invalid decree. A
second marriage, which we may assume is contracted, will be null.
But the bigamist cannot get an annulment decree if the clean hands bar
is applied. If his first spouse later dies, the bad-fellow is then permitted
by society to remarry. He marries a third time and subsequently dies
thirty years after the original divorce decree. The last lady of the
three in our chain is clearly the lawful wife. But in establishing her
rights, she must invalidate marriage number two which appears on the
records. To do this she must prove fraud thirty years past the event,
often an impossible task.
14. Untermann v. Untermann, 19 N.J. 507, 117 A2d 599 (1955).
15. Some divorces are presently not entitled to recognition outside the jurisdiction
where granted. Non-recognition may occur if the foreign divorce decree was won in an
ex parte proceeding. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) ; Cook v. Cook,
116 Vt. 674, 76 A,2d 593 (1950). Even where both parties have appeared in the divorce
action, a subsequent marriage may be void and our petitioners' fault inquiries relevant,
notwithstanding Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), and Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378
(1948), requiring recognition of the foreign divorce; in Steadier v. Steadier, 6 N.J.
380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951), the New Jersey court, interpreting Sherrer, held that
fraud in establishing domicile vitiated a duo parte foreign divorce decree, collusively
obtained. Interestingly, Steadier, supra, itself found it necessary to deal with the clean
hands question, as it was argued that petitioner-wife should be estopped to attack the
foreign decree in which she collusively participated.
16. 268 App. Div. 1003, 52 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1944).
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The annulment-granting cases have much to commend them,1
7
and their rule is simple to apply. Many interests require annulment.
18
The peace of friends and neighbors may be implicated; born and un-
born children can be affected; fresh mates will need protection; tax
collectors and public prosecutors may be hindered in their duties by a
cloudy marriage. New marriage licenses will probably be unobtainable
without a decree, thus producing non-marriageables who are married
to no one, in turn leading to enforced celibacy or promiscuity, and
emotional insecurity. Business interests and credit may be adversely
affected by the absence of a decree declaring the marriage void.
The above discussion should make evident the superiority of the
cases which refuse to invoke the clean hands rule. Where a marriage
is void, no persuasive reason appears as justification for court un-
willingness to make a status declaration, and many community interests
require a decree. Moreover, granting an annulment decree when a
marriage is void does not necessarily negate fixing quasi-marital
responsibilities in proper cases. Two parties may have engaged in a
matrimonial enterprise, legally void, for a considerable time. The
relationship established in fact could rightly be held to result in some
incidents of marriage, such as continuing support, despite the actual
break-up and the court decree of status-voidness.1
9
17. See Chafee, Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MicH. L. Rzv. 1065,
1083 (1949): "It was an evil day when the first American judge to speak of clean
hands had the bright idea of injecting the maxim into the very place where it would
work its greatest mischief. . . ." Id. at 1084: "The clean hands maxim is an impert-
inent intrusion on a very difficult and important judicial job."
18. See Freda v. Bergman, 77 N.J. Eq. 46, 76 Adt. 460 (Ch. 1910) ; Chafee, supra
note 17, at 1083.
19. In Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A2d 436 (1949), a husband sued to annul
his marriage on the ground of the wife's prior subsisting marriage to Chadwick; the
wife counterclaimed for support. The prior marriage was in fact undissolved because
a Mexican divorce decree was void. The court would grant no annulment since it is
common knowledge that mail-order Mexican decrees are not valid divorces. Thus,
unclean hands precluded a decree, on the footing of Tyll v. Keller, 94 N.J. Eq. 426,
120 At. 6 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923). Further, the wife was found not entitled to sup-
port, as this obligation is predicated upon a lawful marriage.
The dissent, of principal interest to us, agreed that the annulment was properly
denied on the basis of unclean hands, but it insisted that an obligation to support should
have been imposed. It was reasoned that the husband's attempt to relieve himself of the
obligation to support which he had voluntarily assumed and continued was unconscion-
able, and equity should not aid him in avoiding this financial responsibility.
In Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940), a second wife sued for
separate maintenance, the husband having obtained no more than an invalid Nevada di-
vorce from wife number one. The court announced that "the subsequent marriage be-
tween plaintiff and defendant . . . was void for the incapacity of the defendant to
marry." Id. at 357, 26 N.E2d at 291. Nevertheless, the court granted separate mainte-
nance. The defendant was not allowed to escape his assumed obligations to the plaintiff.
The dissent in Tonti and the court in Krause show a refusal to be mastered by
well-worn deductions such as no valid marriage, no support.
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VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Voidable marriages present the courts with a still more serious
problem than the void marriage situation. The analogy to divorce is
stronger. If the annulment is refused for unclean hands or for any
other reason, the prospects for a new marriage are not merely cloudy
but nil, absent a ground for divorce.
In Carr v. Carr, a husband sued in New York for annulment
on the ground that he was under-age at the time of his Michigan
marriage. Both parties were from New York but had married in
Michigan where parental consent was not required. Annulment was
denied because, among other reasons, plaintiff came into court with
unclean hands. The result reached was sensible since the husband
was twenty when united in Michigan; but mechanical employment of
the clean hands rule does not appear desirable.21 The plaintiff, who
was quite mature, had undertaken considerable planning to place him-
self in a marital relation which he had enjoyed but from which he now
wished court release. If the marriage was unworkable, it was perhaps
better to refuse annulment and, in effect, ask plaintiff to make proof in
a divorce action, where a general theory of disorganization exists and
machinery is available to ascertain the wife's rights to continuing
support.
However, if a court believes divorce grounds provide an inap-
propriate litmus for the particular relationship, it can produce a socially
equitable result in an annulment action, finding its freedom to do equity
by the presence of petitioner's fault. Instead of a hurried application
of clean hands,' the judge may open inquiry into the personal and
social effects of the voidable marriage. A beneficial result would be
more adequate presentation of evidence bearing upon such effects, as
express relevancies, by counsel for each party.
A sound approach is found in Walker v. Walker, an Ohio case
in which the husband sought dismissal of his wife's divorce action on
the ground of non-marriage, the parties being first cousins. Marriages
of first cousins were found by the court to be voidable. The wife
20. 104 N.Y.S2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
21. See Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944), where
there was a statute prohibiting persons with venereal disease from marrying in the state.
At the time of marriage, both spouses knew plaintiff had venereal disease. Plaintiff
falsified the affidavit required for a license. Held, no annulment. The court found the
marriage voidable, and it applied clean hands to bar relief. "A court of equity will
refuse its aid to a litigant who has been guilty of a violation of a statute, if the act of
violation is directly connected with the matter in litigation." Id. at 769, 14 N.W.2d at
616.
22. See Swenson v. Swenson, 179 Wis. 536, 192 N.W. 70 (1923).
23. 84 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 1948).
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was granted a divorce, the court declaring it "inconceivable . . that
this marriage can be declared void and that this erst-while plaintiff
who has a moderate pension and admitted that he would be able to
go back to work can through this contemptible attempt to declare the
marriage void, escape the obligation to give some support to his
wife." 2 The parties were in their sixties at the time of suit and
were in their thirties when married.
It is frequently held that the woman's concealment from the man
of her pregnancy at the time of the marriage, or a false representation
to him that she is pregnant by him when she is pregnant by another,
amounts to fraud which makes the marriage voidable. But where a
husband has illicit intercourse with his wife before marriage, a clean
hands problem arises. In Arndt v. Arndt, the wife concealed the fact
that she was pregnant by another man, the spouses having had illicit
pre-marital relations. The court held the clean hands doctrine not ap-
plicable and sent the case back for a determination by the trial court of
the paternity of the child. Clean hands was ousted by invoking the
familiar doctrine that the bad acts must relate directly to the matter at
bar, and not to general poor character. The illicit intercourse between
the parties was not the transaction in litigation: the acts complained of
were the alleged illicit intercourse with another, resulting in pregnancy,
and the subsequent concealment of that fact; plaintiff was not soiled
with respect to these latter acts.
Such strained reasoning results from preoccupation with clean
hands as a mighty rule. The Arndt decision is perhaps supportable
by arguing that the basis for annulment, pregnancy by another, is dis-
tinguishable from concealed lack of chastity by the incapacity of the
wife to fulfill her marital duties. This lack of marriageability is not
lessened by fault on the part of plaintiff. Thus, the marriage begins in
an unstable position. Further, the husband is put to the alternative of
disowning the child and revealing his wife's prosmiscuity or permitting
the child to share his resources.
Against these arguments are others embodying important social
policies. The husband was on notice concerning his wife's pre-marital
propensities, and took his chances when he entered marriage. The
state may be interested in promoting self-reliance in marital choice.
The husband is the most likely prospect, in many such cases, through
which to channel the child's support. If the court denies an annulment,
the husband is not apt to contest the child's, legitimacy. Even if he
24. Id. at 259.
25. 336 II. App. 65, 82 N.E.2d 908 (1948).
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does, the child's position will not be greatly impaired, since granting
the annulment would in any event disclose the illegitimacy. Perhaps
the husband should be forced to take his wife for better or worse, with
pre-marital liabilities of this type. There are hazards involved in
marriage, and the alleged acts may be another risk to impose where the
husband has inquiry notice. The husband's resources are available to
pay for his own mistakes, and arguably, they should be available to his
chosen mate to pay for hers.
While these considerations are not intended to be exhaustive, or
by way of resolution, they do indicate that much more is involved
than the old chore-boy, clean hands. Yet the presence of a soiled peti-
tioner could frequently be turned to advantage by a court. If petitioner
is not at fault, a broad inquiry might be impossible since the litigable
issue may be limited to testing the presence of stated grounds for annul-
ment. If there is fault, the broader inquiry can be pursued since discre-
tion arises to bar relief. The court's order can then be expected to facil-
itate an equitable, supportable social adjustment. This argument is
applicable in voidable marriage situations where courts decide whether
to continue or terminate otherwise legal relations. In void marriage
cases, however, this employment of petitioners' fault in aid of proper
dispositions is not possible, the marriages being, by definition, without
validity, status determination is outside judicial discretion.
DIVORCE
In divorce cases, courts are often imposed upon by perjuring and
misrepresenting petitioners. This situation brings forth the clean hands
principle since it is commonly held that one must both enter equity with
clean hands and keep them clean during the suit.2"
In Zearfoss v. Zearfoss, ' where adultery was alleged and a divorce
prayed by the husband, the petitioner falsely claimed that the paramour's
name was unknown to him. This untrue allegation was repeated in an
affidavit in verification of the petition. The court dismissed the action,
finding the husband's conduct ". . . unconscionable and requir[ing]
the dismissal of the petition under well-established principles of
equity." 28 While it is important that the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem be protected, this aim may be pursued by other methods. In
Zearfoss, it could be that the court was overly sensitive, and although
the court states the representation is material, it is difficult to accept
26. See Gluec v. Rynda Development Co., 99 N.J. Eq. 788, 134 At. 363 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1926), aff'd, 100 N.J. Eq. 554, 135 Atl. 917 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
27. 112 N.J. Eq. 530, 164 Atl. 893 (Ch. 1933).
28. Id. at 531, 164 Atl. at 894.
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the notion that plaintiff is a citizen who has forfeited his right to a basic
status determination. Meanwhile, a marriage which may in fact be
beyond hope, and a source of community trouble, cannot be operated
upon by the judiciary.
Even if Zearfoss be thought correct, since the fraud was in the
pleading, consider Pfender v. Pfender 9  There, a petition for divorce
had resulted in a decree nisi which was based upon charges of extreme
cruelty, including an unjust accusation of infidelity and a threat against
petitioner's life. When the decree was originally rendered, the court
had been led to believe by petitioner's false and misleading testimony
that friendly relations between himself and another woman were of
short duration and had long since ended. At the present hearing on an
application to set aside the decree nisi, it appeared that the affair be-
tween Mr. Pfender and Miss Haas had expanded continually, and that
the petitioner had come to share an apartment with Miss Haas and
her mother. The court vacated the decree nisi, and dismissed the peti-
tion for divorce. The very interesting language of the court follows: 10
"In Clickner v. Clickner . . . this court held that where
a suitor in equity has been guilty of false or misleading testimony
and conduct in the presentation and hearing of his cause, his suit
will be dismissed irrespective of whether or not he might otherwise
be entitled to relief. The rule of that case is plainly applicable
here. This does not mean that the defendant's threat against the
petitioner's life, and because of which the decree nisi was advised,
was justified or in any sense excusable; it means only that the un-
conscionable conduct of a suitor in a matter in which he seeks
relief will prompt a court of equity to remain passive."
It is believed that this reasoning is insupportable3' Contempt and
perjury indictments are the appropriate methods for handling the
Pfender petitioner's fault problem. These remedies are constructed in
independent proceedings in which allegedly bad persons are able to
better safeguard their rights, while still receiving merited discipline.
The matrimonial action, with its wider significance, is a less appro-
priate medium for punishing petitioners and, in any case, imposition of
marital handicaps has not proved effective in securing the integrity
of judicial proceedings. Possible benefit may lie in the direction of
procedural reform in matrimonial cases.
29. 104 N.J. Eq. 107, 144 Atl. 333 (Ch. 1929).
30. Id. at 112, 144 Atl. at 335.
31. Another ground besides petitioner's deception supports the decision rendered,
as petitioner was found to have committed adultery after the decree nisi.
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Recrimination
The doctrine of recrimination is another petitioners' fault recep-
tacle.3 2 Irrespective of its historical foundation, the doctrine is today
recognized as a manifestation of the clean hands principle.' The usual
American rule declares the petitioner barred from obtaining a divorce,
whatever the strength of his affirmative proofs, where he is himself
guilty of misconduct giving rise to a cause of action for divorce on any
ground. 4  Thus, if both spouses prove grounds for divorce, neither
can be given a decree. In light of the foregoing discussion, the point
need not be labored that the automatic application of this proposition
is without justification, as it enthrones the worst sort of clean hands
thinking.
Nonetheless, the attitude of a good many courts is typified by
Hollingworth v. Hollingworth," where it was said that
"The social wisdom of the doctrine which, because of mutual
fault, continues the marriage status as a matter of law when it has
necessarily ended as a matter of fact has been the subject of severe
criticism in recent days, but this court is committed to the doctrine
that a plaintiff cannot have relief in equity unless he comes into
court with clean hands. . ', 36
Some courts have even appeared to relish the doctrine.3 7 Thus,
in Parks v. Parks,8 where neither spouse was granted a divorce, the
court declared that "Equity relieves the injured party, but not the van-
quished." "9
In recent years, the use of recrimination I has been considerably
affected by the coming of comparative rectitude, new grounds for
divorce such as insanity and incompatibility not based on fault, and
the molding of recrimination into a discretionary device.
The modern approach was championed by Justice Traynor's out-
standing opinion for the majority in the 1952 California case of De
Burgh v. De Burgh.4 ' At trial, the court had found both parties guilty
of extreme cruelty and had decided that both being guilty, neither was
32. See 41 CAn. L. Rtv. 320 (1953).
33. See Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N.W. 160 (1882).
34. See Morrison v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N.E. 59, 56 Am. Rep. 688
(1886) ; MADDIlN, PMsoNs AND Do msric RELATIONs 307 (1931).
35. 173 Ore. 286, 145 P2d 466 (1944).
36. Id. at 293, 145 P.2d at 468.
37. See Cody v. Cody, 233 S.W2d 777 (Mo. 1950).
38. 182 Ore. 322, 187 P2d 145 (1947).
39. Id. at 329, 187 P.2d at 147.
40. See 41 CALn. L. R-v. 320, 322 (1953).
41. 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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entitled to a divorce. On appeal, it was held error to apply recrimina-
tion mechanically, and the case was sent back to the trial court for find-
ings with respect to indicated social facts, these findings to be support
for a further determination as to whether petitioner's fault should bar
his claim.
De Burgh overcame a restrictive recrimination statute dating
from 1872 and a long train of case law ensconcing the standard doc-
trine of recrimination. California Civil Code defined recrimination,
elsewhere designated as a cause for the mandatory denial of divorce,42
as "a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the
" 43plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause. ".
Expressly disapproving contrary precedents, the court held the
words "in bar" evidenced a legislative intention that the mere finding
of a cause of divorce chargeable against the plaintiff is not to be consid-
ered recriminatory. An additional requirement that such a cause for
divorce must be "in bar" of the plaintiff's cause is found in the statutory
language. Three of the seven justices disagreed with this interpreta-
tion.
To decide whether the fault of a petitioner is "in bar," the opinion
declared "there can be no precise formula for determining when a cause
of divorce shown against the plaintiff is to be considered a bar to his
suit for divorce, for the divorce court, as a court of equity . . . is
clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements of justice
in each particular case." 4 The major considerations governing deci-
sions were stated: the prospect of reconciliation, the effect of the marital
conflict upon the parties, the conflict's effect upon third parties, and
comparative guilt.'
Under these headings, numberless subsidiary factors are plainly
included. In scrutinizing reconciliation chances, for example, the scope
of investigation embraces "whether the legitimate objects of matrimony
have been destroyed," 4 the ages and temperaments of the parties, the
42. CAL. Civ. CoDm § 111 (Deering 1949).
43. CAr.. Crv. CODE § 122 (Deering 1949).
44. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 872, 250 P.2d 598, 606 (1952).
45. Comparative guilt is a particularly important consideration in California since
economic rights turn on which litigant obtains the decree where both ask for divorce.
A California court may not give alimony to a party who has not secured a divorce
decree; and, if a party is not granted a divorce, the other becomes an "innocent" party
and may be awarded over one-half of the community property upon dissolution of the
marriage. See De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 874, 250 P.2d 598, 607 (1952).
However, both may be granted a divorce, making neither an "innocent" party, thus
forcing an equal division of the community property. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 239, 270 P.2d 80 (1954).
46. Id. at 864, 250 P.2d at 601.
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length of their marriage, the seriousness and frequency of their miscon-
duct and the likelihood of recurrence, the finality of the separation, and
the sincerity of efforts to harmonize differences. Still more immense
will be the sally into the effect upon third persons, where children's
interests, those of friends, neighbors, and relatives, and multitudinous
general community objectives need measurement.
It cannot be doubted that the balancing task in such scenarios tries
the wisest judge. The opinion in Gilmore v. Gilmore,47 commenting
upon the refusal of divorce and alimony to plaintiff-wife while granting
a decree to defendant, noted in a specific context that "[I]t was neces-
sary . . . to weigh the conflicting charges of sexual abnormality,
none of which were established as grounds for relief, plaintiff's con-
tinuous course of cruel conduct toward defendant, defendant's lack of
cruelty toward plaintiff, defendant's adultery, plaintiff's need for sup-
port, and defendant's ability to provide it." 48
The absence of judicial ability to strike a true balance, if such
there be, is not a legitimate criticism of De Burgh. If the De Burgh
inquiry be the proper one, and our argument looks to its validity, the
difficulty of application should not defeat the approach. Someone
should make the investigation which is deemed to be appropriate; at
present, that job falls to the judiciary, and the representation of litigant
interests by counsel no doubt produces very substantial help. Conduct-
ing far-reaching searches could be highly educational for trial judges,
who may be expected to become increasingly insatiable fact-seekers in
other family cases. The scheme in essence calls for a fact-based
common-sense judgment, which extends a judge no further than his
individual limit.
It is evident, and significant, that the inquiry required by De Burgh
in recrimination cases will influence other petitioners' fault litigations.
Indeed, De Burgh itself suggests that the carry-over, possibly with the
De Burgh requirement that findings support the determination of bar
or no bar, might be mandatory in other categories of clean hands cases.
This possibility is found in the emphasis upon recrimination as simply
a species of unclean hands and the court's injunction to "[keep] in
mind that the doctrine of recrimination, like the doctrine of unclean
hands of which it is a part, is neither puristic nor mechanical, but an
equitable principle to be applied according to the circumstances of each
case and with a proper respect for the paramount interests of the com-
munity at large." 49
47. 45 Cal.2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955).
48. Id. at 148, 287 P.2d at 773.
49. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal2d 858, 870, 250 P.2d 598, 605 (1952).
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The De Burgh case has already passed its fact confines in affect-
ing other decisions. The opinion was influential in speeding procedure,
through construction of a rule of court, in an alimony litigation which
followed a divorce decree; 50 the court noted that De Burgh requires
the public's interest in matrimonial cases to be paramount. De Burgh
also helped a court to the liberal view that the public interest in marriage
required allowance of a supplemental complaint which stated a cause
of action different from that pleaded in the complaint,51 rendering un-
necessary the commencement of another action on the new ground. An
Idaho case " and a Montana case, 3 both involving recrimination prob-
lems, leaned heavily on De Burgh and incorporated its modern socio-
logical approach into the jurisprudence of their states.
The majority opinion in De Burgh is at the center of our discus-
sion, not only as it provides a forward look for mutual fault divorce
actions and allows increased hope for breaking the stranglehold of the
standard doctrine of recrimination, but most importantly because it
gives a highly promising approach applicable generally to petitioners'
fault problems in matrimonial actions. This writer espouses the De
Burgh process for all matrimonial fault cases, its applicability being
evident in all situations except perhaps void marriage cases. Although
the granting of an annulment is recommended in all void marriage
cases, the method of De Burgh is highly relevant in making the fur-
ther determination of appropriate economic and other responsibilities.
One might question the approval of a discretionary tool in double
fault divorce suits in preference to total exclusion of petitioners' fault
from consideration. 4 The choice here made to condemn automatic
recrimination and yet favor the possibility of its employment in excep-
tional cases, turns upon some lack of faith in "grounds" for divorce as
infallible solvents. Under American statutes, these grounds are to a
large extent empty forms, utilized with only partial success by the courts
in the social behalf.
A theory introducing flexibility and comprehensive fact finding ap-
pears commendable. In an unusual case, conceivable circumstances
might legitimately cause the fault of petitioner to foreclose a divorce
where, for example, children would be harmed by a decree or extreme
marital conduct makes petitioner particularly unfit for entry into a new
marriage and defendant wishes continuance of the existing marriage,
50. Hall v. Superior Court, 278 P.2d 124 (Cal. App. 1954).
51. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 282 P.2d 598 (Cal. App.), rev'd on other grounds,
45 Cal2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955).
52. Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953).
53. Bissell v. Bissell, 129 Mont. 187, 284 P2d 264 (1955).
54. A similar query, and a similar answer, arises in connection with petitioners'
fault and the granting of decrees in voidable marriage annulment actions.
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or, to mention a De Burgh factor, the prospects for reconciliation seem
to the court extraordinarily bright.
SUPPORT
Support, separate maintenance, and alimony actions witness their
share of bad-acting parties. While factual variations on the basic plays
can be readily suggested, the anatomy of petitioners' fault situations in
matters of support need here be illustrated by only two cases.
Where a husband who petitioned for reduction of alimony had
never voluntarily paid one cent under the existing alimony decree,
Bergwardt v. Bergwardt " held that his lack of clean hands barred the
petition. Alimony is a duty of continuing support which survives the
demise of the marriage and in assessing Bergwardt, the frame of the
general marital duty of support provides an initial standard.
Upon application of a wife for support, the court's paramount duty
is to adjust the economic positions of the parties in the most socially de-
sirable manner. Ordinarily this involves refusal on the one hand to
burden the husband with a financial obligation so heavy that his liveli-
hood, his mental health, and his other resource-sharers are prejudiced;
and on the other hand, granting the wife sufficient economic assistance
that her well-being and fulfillment of her marital duties are not jeopard-
ized. Thus, the health of the marriage and the happiness of the parties
are to be furthered by the court's decree. To paraphrase De Burgh,"0
there is little room for fault as a determining factor.
In Bergwardt, the marriage may no longer be susceptible to pres-
ervation, but the effect of alimony upon petitioner's earning capacity,
his emotional welfare and his other obligations, and upon the woman's
personal fulfillment within her social framework remain to be consid-
ered. There is little reason to give the ex-wife a bounty and to punish
the ex-husband through a sum he cannot sustain, with resultant
tendencies toward social disorganization in the wake of the over-
burdened obligor. If the woman's position has been economically
impaired through payment defaults, this may become a legitimate fac-
tor in the award balance under general alimony principles without rigid
use of clean hands. The problem of defaulting alimony obligors should
be solved through improved supplementary proceedings in aid of judg-
ments, and not by continuance of alimony awards inapplicable to the
parties' factual position.
These considerations bearing on the proper content of alimony
orders were recognized by the important 1954 case of Du Pont v.
55. 257 Ala. 288, 59 So. 2d 81 (1952).
56. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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Du Pont 7 The lower court granted separate maintenance in the sum
of $300 monthly to the wife, who had been abandoned without just
cause. The award was very meager in view of the economic circum-
stances of the husband; but plaintiff's pre-marital iniquities (living off
men) and her subsequent perjurous statements about these iniquities
at the trial induced the court to shrink the amount otherwise indicated.
The trial judge frankly explained that "in the absence of the 'diminish-
ing' factors mentioned above, [he] would here have awarded plaintiff
a substantially larger sum because defendant has substantial means." 5
The trial judge's position was held erroneous, and his decision
was reversed. The court said that curtailing the full extent of Mrs.
Du Pont's rights may satisfy the demands of righteous indignation,
but would also establish the intolerable precedent of offering husbands
a cash premium for raking over their wives' pre-marital past. Signifi-
cantly, the court noted that even where the bad conduct occurred after
marriage, there is a marked tendency to regard separate maintenance
orders "as being primarily matters of economics" " and that "the ju-
diciary has no prerogative to impose sanctions for sin." 60
Normally, husband and wife live together; in such a state, the wife
may not be relegated to sub-standard enjoyment of the family's
economic resources. Where, as in the Du Pont situation, they are not
living together because the husband has left the wife without legal
excuse, the wife's premarital wrong should not be permitted to im-
prove the husband's position. If he cannot dissolve the marriage and
cannot justify leaving his wife, then, according to Du Pont, "the duty
of support is automatically established and defined." o' Clean hands
and appropriate matrimonial obligations are seen as distinct. 2
57. 103 A.2d 234 (Del. 1954).
58. 33 Del. Ch. 364, 374, 93 A.2d 500, 505 (1952).
59. 103 A.2d 234, 237 (Del. 1954).
60. Id. at 237.
61. Id. at 238.
62. It should be noted that in the cases involving intraspousal property rights, dis-
tinguished from support litigation, the social problems involved in status decrees and
in determinations concerning marital incidents are largely absent. The courts often
apply the clean hands rule without harmful results. In Potter v. Boisvert, 117 Cal.
App. 2d 688, 256 P.2d 625 (1953), a partnership business, purchased with partnership
funds, was put in the wife's name to prevent a wife whom the husband left in the East
from learning his whereabouts. Held, the wife was the sole owner of the property.
The husband did not come into equity with clean hands so he could not secure court aid.
Practical results are common in this area and are more easily accomplished. In
Marvin v. Foster, 61 Minn. 154, 63 N.W. 484 (1895), the husband was not served in a
Minnesota suit giving the wife a divorce. However, he remarried, relying on the judg-
ment. The first wife died, and the husband asserted a right to her estate as a surviving
spouse. The court held that the husband could not recover, noting that the husband was
trying to assert the invalidity of the decree solely to obtain the former wife's property.
See also Rice v. Moore, 194 Ark. 585, 109 S.W.2d 148 (1937) ; Hooker v. Hooker, 130
Conn. 41, 32 A.2d 68 (1943) ; Joy v. Miles, 190 Miss. 255, 199 So. 771 (1941).
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After noting the inapplicability of clean hands, the Du Pont court
considered the larger question of whether the perjury was extraneous
to the issue of the amount this husband should provide for support of
his wife. In answering the question affirmatively, the court made con-
tempt the remedy for perjury, permitting the matrimonial petitioner
to obtain her judgment on the basis of family economics alone. Thus,
the fundamental judicial responsibility for producing situationally-
defensible adjustments is given life.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the family problem area legal views are becoming
less reliant upon deduction as the realization grows that more than
lip-service must be rendered to the public interest. In order to ad-
equately govern family life, personal-group needs are being recognized
as the necessary object of intensive fact investigation. The clean hands
doctrine is often a cruel distinguisher of persons. Enlightened con-
sideration of the factors present in matrimonial litigation requires more
beneficent exercise of judicial authority. The decision in Du Pont
demonstrates the healing qualities required of judgments in such ac-
tions. When taken together with De Burgh, we have the most usable
and forward-looking structure yet given to problems of petitioners'
fault in American law.
Many a weak decision is still to be rendered, saddled as we are
with a thick crust of poor clean hands law. Yet the persuasiveness of
this law is lessening. Although De Burgh and Du Pont do not mag-
ically resolve related individual problems, they do provide a compelling
direction by allowing an expanded inquiry into the social needs pre-
sented for service. This paper has attempted to encourage a broad use
of these modern decisions, beyond the usual narrow category applica-
tions. Rarely have void-marriage fault cases, for example, been
thought applicable to support problems or to the illumination of stat-
utory recrimination questions. By grouping matrimonial petitioners'
fault problems together, and displaying them as siblings, it is hoped
that the advancing decisions will be considered relevant through the
entire plane under discussion.
